Rules aren't always 'moral' or 'legal'

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the eighth of 15 articles in the series "Moral Choles in Contemporary Society" and is the text for an Oakland University Courses by Newspaper program. The program was developed by University Extension of the University of California, San Diego, and funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Copyright 1977 by the Regents of the University of California.

By LON L. FULLER

Law and morality, to varying degrees, regulate human interaction in society, sometimes reinforcing one another, at other times imposing contradictory obligations.

But there are also many laws that we little to do with the larger issues have little to do with the larger issues of moral conduct—with securing justice, equality or such other forms of "good" as may be deemed desirable. These laws are, rather, pragmatic regulations for facilitating or making possible orderly relations between records.

Still other decisions affecting the conduct of society are not guided even by these pragmatic regulations. Such decisions cannot be reached through the application of impersonal, objective rules; indeed, the basis for them cannot be found in either law or morality, and yet they are binding on the individuals concerned.

To understand these issues. I suggest we examine some of the actual operattions of a legal order and the ways in which legal rules and processes are employed to shape and control human behavior.

I SHOULD LIKE to begin with a body of law regulating vehicular traffic and known as "the rule of the road."

Over most of the world, the rule is that you pass the oncoming vehicle on the right and overtake on the left the vehicle moving ahead of you. A minority of countries, including Great Britain, have an opposite rule—you pass on the left and overtake on the right.

Though the rule is now practically verywhere embodied in written stateverywhere embodied in written stat-utes, it took its origin in unwritten cus-tomary practice, which helps to ex-plain how there came to be two rules, each serving the same function within its own territory.

"The rule of the road" would seem to present little in the way of tensions between law and morality. The man with consideration for others and an ardent desire not to do harm to them will, as a driver, follow the rule of the

If he is morally indifferent to the fate of others, he will nevertheless be likely to observe the rule of the road, not only to avoid being brought into court but to save his own skin.

THERE ARE PROBLEMS, how

Even in ordinary traffic, rules of the road depend upon a sense of re-sponsibility toward the other fellow and some perception of the problems he faces.

The law of traffic is thus not merely The law of trailic is thus not merely punitive; it is essentially facilitative. It lets the driver know, with some assurance, what he can expect, not only from the traffic officer but from other drivers as well.

This matter of knowing what to expect is basic in any functioning legal order. In his book, "The Law of Primitive Man." Adamson Hobel writes that a visitor to the Musk Ox Eskimos in Canada learned that all 55 adult males in the community in the early 1920s had been either a principal or an accessory in a murder. Hoebel reports:

"For each of them, 'the motive was

ADDITIONS . PORCHES DORMERS • GARAGES ATTICS . BATHROOMS

KITCHENS . REMODELING

Lon L. Fuller is Carter professor of general juris-prudence, emeritus, at Harvard University, where has taught since 1939. Previously he taught at Oregon, Illinois and Duke. His published works include "The Law in Quest of Itself," "The Morality of Law," a case-book in the lay of contracts (editor) and numerous arti-cles on jurisprudence.





invariably some quarrel about a woman. In part, the Eskmo difficulties are enhanced by the lack of marriage and divorce rituals which might demarcate the beginning and the end of a marital relationship. Marriage is entered into merely by bedding down with the intention of Eving logether: divorce is affected simply by not living together any more. There may be a certain irony in comparing a marriage ecremony with a highway stop sign, but the analogy is not lacking a certain validity.

LET US CONSIDER briefly the law

LET US CONSIDER briefly the law of divorce.

In former times, that law was to a large extent 'objective' and 'impersonal.' To obtain a divorce, a party to the marriage had to prove some specified act or omission on the part of his or her partner. Among the acts that would justify the granting of a divorce were adultery, desertion, habitual drunkenness and other similar forms of mischavior. This meant the law of divorce was like the rule of the road, impersonal and "act-oriented."

Recently, there has been a devel-

and "act-oriented."

Recently, there has been a development in many invisidictions that is

Recently, there has been a devel-opment in many jurisdictions that is called "the theory of the breakdown-of-the-marriage." Instead of having to prove some spe-cifically defined misconduct by the party against whom the divorce sust is brought, what has to be established is that the parties have lost the capaci-ty for a functioning markal relation-ship.

ty for a tuncuoning measure.

Ship.

Perhaps the best test of a loss of this capacity is to have a skilled mediator attempt a reconciliation of the parties. But the judge who has the ultimate power to decide the case may or may not have any special aptitude for guiding a mediative procedure toward an ultimate reconciliation.

If, after discussing with the husband and wife their conceptions of the problems that have caused their marriage to fail, the judge grants a divorce, this does not mean that the standards which have guided him to such a conclusion can properly be categorized as either "moraf" or "legal."

Neither party may have acted im-morally or illegally, but their diver-gent dispositions may have made a successful marriage impossible.

IN OUR COMPLEX and densely populated societies, there are many decisions that cut deeply into men's lives, but that cannot be shaped or jus-tified by standards derived directly from morality or law.

An example would be zoning regulations. These regulations may limit the size of a house, determine how closely the house may be located to the street it faces, stipulate how high a radio antenna on the roof may be.

Regulations of this sort can often be realized on a showing of a special need to make an exception in the case at hand. The request for a relaxation of a particular restriction will be particular restriction will be agency, which is a administrative agency, which can be relaxation will proceed in a manner much like that of a court of law.

HOME BUILDERS

WHITEFIELD DEARBORN

Serving the Area For 22 Years

FREE ESTIMATES • 5 YEARS TO PAY NO MONEY DOWN Quality Workmanship Only

WE SPECIALIZE IN RESIDENTIAL

Pall LO 5-9070

But what may be lacking is the guidance of formal rules stating with some precision under what conditions the normal restraints may be lifted. On what basis, then, is an exception to the regulatory law to be granted?

The householder may have an expensive radio and may ask to be given the privilege of extending his antenna to a height above what is normally allowed.

He may rest his request on any number of claims tending to establish that he settled in a present and the settled of the set

Der of claims tending to establish that his situation is a special one: He is working on an invention affecting radio transmission that requires a higher antenna; he is a physician who wants to give advice to patients who have radio sets but no telephones, since they live in a somewhat distant mountain range.

LET ME CONCLUDE with another

LET ME CONCLUDE with another hypothetical case that may not be readily decided either by rules of law or familiar principles of morality. Two men. strangers to one another, are charged with committing identical crimes. Both admit their guilt. It happens he only available person is so packed with convicts that here sonly a single cell with room for one more. The judge cannot send both men to prison, which one shall he sentence?

there or pisson, which one shall he sen-tence?

It would hardly be befitting for the judge to suggest that the convicted men throw dice to see who goes in and who stays out.

Suppose that one of the convicted parties has over the years, been convicted of 10 different crimes and served a term of impresonment for each. The result is that jail has become for him almost like a home, and he has no special dread of serving another term.

term.

The other man has never before been convicted of a crime, and serving a term in jail might or might not put an end to his incipient criminal tradapairs.

The judge cannot send both men to jail. Which one shall he sentence?

NEXT WEEK: The effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent to crime

See Our Fathers HALLMARK CARDS Day June 19 McDevitt

GARAGE DOOR OPERATORS Genie 450D

CRYPTAR II DIGITAL CONTROLS \$175.00 installed ALLIANCE AUTOMATIC DOOR CO.







